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CASENOTES
whether his right existed, either before, at the time of, or after rendition
of the decree. The reason such attack is permitted is not because interested
persons were injured in any property rights at the time the decree was
rendered; it is simply because, if the decree is void, they are not bound
by it and someone is attempting to use it against their present interests.3,
There is a vast difference between the available remedies against
invalid decrees, depending upon who the parties are that desire to attack
the decree. The mode of procedure in such cases and circumstances under
which the exercise of such power can be invoked successfully, varies in
the different jurisdictions. For these reasons the decisions in one state
afford but little aid in determining matters of this kind in another
jurisdiction.
Since in a great majority of divorces neither party wishes to disturb
the decree, if their acquiescence should be allowed to have the effect
supposed, third persons may be affected in their property and in their
sacred personal rights without ever having had an opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, although "all the world is not a party to a divorce proceeding,"3 9




Over objection, a chancellor ordered a reference to a master to
report findings of fact and conclusions relative to applicable law. On
petition for writ of certiorari to quash the reference, held, the chancellor
was in effect delegating the decision of the case to the master, and this
could not be done over the objection of a party. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d
59 (Fla. 1954).
A reference to a master is an equity proceeding which has for its
purpose the determination of disputed issues.' An order of reference may
be made at any stage of a suit, 2 and all persons in interest are entitled
to attend and be notified thereof. 3  A master is an assistant of the
chancellor;4 his function is the performance of acts, either judicial or
ministerial in nature, which the chancellor, in accordance with equity
practice, may require of him." Reference is to be distinguished from
arbitration in that the latter allows the substitution of a decision by an
38. Ibid.
39. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 at 231 (1945).
1. 19 AM. JUR., Equity § 364 (1952); 23 R. C. L. 284 (1929).
2. Field v. Holland, 6 Crunch 8 (U.S. 1810); accord, Pepper v. Addicks, 153
Fed. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1907); Briggs v. Neal, 120 Fed. 224 (4th Cir. 1903).
3. Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684 (1884); Eslava v. Lepretre, 21 Ala. 504,
56 Am. Dec. 266 (1852).
4. Richardson v. Frazier, 247 Litt. (Ky.) 59, 56 S.W.2d 708 (1933).
5. Schuchardt v. People, 99 I11. 501, 39 Am. Rep. 34 (1881).
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arbitrator in extra-judicial proceedings, for the judgment of a court.6 A
master acts as a representative of the chancery court, and his official
conduct and report is subject to the court's control and supervision.' He
derives his power from the court and is governed by the rules of court
which specifically prescribe his duties and the manner of their performance.8
The usefulness of reference procedure is that it relieves the court of work
by pre-determining complex issues.9
A distinction is made between involuntary and consent references, it
being held that where a reference is ordered without the consent of all the
parties the report is advisory only, and the court must act ultimately on
its own judgment.10 Where the reference is by consent the findings are
presumed correct and are reviewable only, by reservation in the consent
and order entered thereon, for manifest error in the consideration given
to evidence or in the application of the law.11 In Burns v. Burns,12 the
court said of cases lacking consent to the reference that the ". . . report
of the special master was only advisory to the chancellor who was, of
course, not bound to follow the conclusions of law or fact of the special
master or his recommendations." 13  There are authorities holding that it
is not competent for a court of chancery to refer the entire decision of all
issues, both of fact and of law, to a master without the consent of the
parties. 4 However, it is generally held that where a reference is made,
without the consent of the parties, to find the facts and conclusions of
law, the report is to be regarded as advisory only.15
In this case, the Florida Court based its decision mainly upon a
specific point raised in Harmon v. Harmon,'0 wherein it was held that a
6. 3 Am. )UN., Arbitration and Award § 3 (1952).
7. Richardson v. Frazier, 247 Ky. 59, 56 S.W.2d 708 (1933).
8. Carr v, Fair, 92 Ark. 359, 122 S.W. 659 (1909); Farmer & Arnold v. Samuel,
4 Litt. (Ky.) 187, 14 Am. Dec. 106 (1823); Rice v. Rice, 47 N.J. Eq. 559 (1891).
9. 23 R.C.L. 284 (1929); HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE 34, et seq. § 26.
10. Lone Star Gas Co. v. City of Fort Worth, 93 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1938);
19 AM. JuR., Equity § 255 (1952).
11. Harris v. First State Bank of Dawson, Ga., 260 Fed. 685 (N.D. Ga. 1919);
Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1949); McAdow v. Smith, 127 Fla. 29. 172 So.
448 (1937); Kent v. Knowles, 101 Fla. 1375, 133 So. 315 (1931); Croom v. Ocala
Plumbing and Electric Co., 62 Fla. 460. 57 So. 243 (1911).
12. 153 Fla. 73, 13 So.2d 599 (1943).
13. 153 Fla. 73, 76, 13 So.2d 599 at 601 (1943).
14. Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 229 Fed. 623 (Ist Cir. 1915): Stokes v.
Williams, 226 Fed. 148 (3d Cir. 1915); Hattiesburg Lumber Co. v. lerrick. 212 Fed.
834 (5th Cir. 1914); WHIEiousr., EQUITY PRACTICE 583 (1st ed. 1915); BEACH,
MODERN EQUITY PRACTIC. 666; VANZILE, EQulrY PLEADEN AND PRACTICE 435;
FLETCHER, EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 595 (1st ed. 1902).
15. Oteri v. Scalzo, 145 U.S. 578 (1892); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 523
(1888); Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.. 156 Fed. 309 (D. Mont. 1907);
Mastin v. Noble, 157 Fed. 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1907); Caringer v. Palmer, 126 Fed.
906, 911 (6th Cir, 1904); Blythe v. Thomas, 45 Fed. 784 (D.S.C. 1891).
But 4. FEn. R. Civ: P. 53 (e) (2):
... . In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept
the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
16. 40 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1949).
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master's recommendations should be set aside only upon good cause,
even though the findings were advisory. The court, in the instant case,
interpreted this decision to mean that the reference which instructed
the master to make findings of fact as well as conclusions of law, in effect,
usurped the court's function. The court held that this was tantamount
to permitting the master to render the final decision in the case, since it
left the chancellor powerless to act where there is ample evidence to
sustain the findings of a master. This, the court concluded, could not
be done over the objection of one of the parties.
Perhaps the court erred in its decision through a misinterpretation of
the holding in Harmon v. Harmon. The weight of authority is that a
reference by a court of chancery to a master may be made over the
objection of the parties, but where a party objects to such a reference,
the master's report is to be considered as advisory rather than conclusive.
It is the opinion of the writer that the Harmon case is not in opposition
to the weight of authority. Therefore, there is no apparent precedent
for the decision of this court in quashing the order of reference on the
grounds stated.
DONALD STUART ZUCKERMAN
EVIDENCE-FEDERAL WAGERING TAX STAMP-
ABATEMENT OF GAMBLING NUISANCE
The state sought to enjoin, as a nuisance, an alleged lottery and
bookmaking business. The state's only evidence was the fact that the
defendants had purchased a Federal Wagering Occupational Tax Stamp
and had paid the tax of 10%, on their gross income from gambling. Held:
Mere purchase and possession of a gambling tax stamp is not sufficient
evidence to establish the maintenance of a gambling house. Boynton v.
State, 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954).
A Florida statute1 makes any place or building wherein gambling is
engaged a nuisance and subject to abatement.2 Even the early common
law held that keeping a gambling house was a public nuisance. 3 The
effect of the statute is that it makes this conduct a nuisance per se,4 to
enjoin which it is only necessary to prove commission of the act.- As a
I. FLA. STAT. § 823.05 (1953).
2. FLA. STAT. § 64.11 (1953).
3. Bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 226 Pac. 549 (1924); State v. Vaughan,
81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685 (1906); Ehrlick v. Comm., 125 Ky. 742, 102 S.W. 289
(1907); Roberts v. Reille, 50 NY.S.2d 196 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1944); People v. Langan,
196 N.Y. 260, 89 N.E. 921 (1909); Ex Parte Allison, 99 Tex. 455, 90 S.W. 870 (1906).
4. Pompano Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927); State v. 30
Club, 124 Mont. 91, 219 P.2d 307 (1950).
5. Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 U.2d 236 (1941); People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d
872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941); Robinson v. \Vestman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1 (1947).
